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SUMMARY 
Management Buy-Outs occur when the managers of a company buy the 
company from its owners, namely the shareholders. Where such a 
company is a listed public company, the transaction is known as "going 
private. 11 The critics allege that this type of buy-out leads to irreconcilable 
conflicts of interests, a breach of fiduciary duties and to insider trading by 
the directors. For this reason Management Buy-Outs should be prohibited 
or alternatively, regulated to such an extent as to make them virtually 
unworkable. 
It is submitted that these conflicts are not irreconcilable and that they are no 
different to the myriad of other conflicts which arise out of the promotion, 
incorporation and the operation of a company. Both statute and the 
common law effectively deal with most of the critics' apprehensions without 
necessarily prohibiting the transactions giving rise to them. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
A Management Buy-Out is a process whereby a management consortium 1 
buys the existing shareholders' shares in a company. The shareholders 
may be public shareholders in a listed company (this buy-out process is · 
known as "going private"2) or any number of shareholders in an unlisted 
entity. While Management Buy-Outs have changed a great deal in recent 
years, basic conflicts of interest arising during the buy-out process still 
remain, particularly during "going private" transactions. There are three 
major problem areas which must be addressed. The first occuring when the 
assets are purchased, the second occuring when either the assets or the 
shares are purchased and the third when the shares and, to a limited extent, 
the assets are purchased. 
First, the members of the management team have an inevitable conflict of 
interest when it is considered that when they buy the assets of the company, 
they must serve effectively as fiduciaries on behalf of the selling company 
and at the same time negotiate on their own behalf as buyers. Such a 
conflict arises as a result of the management being duty bound to obtain the 
best possible price for the assets on the one hand and as purchasers, 
wanting the lowest possible price in order to service the enormously high 
2 
The buy-out team may include both director and non-director managers. In South 
Africa there is now a trend, as in Canada. to subject "top management" to the same 
fiduciary duties as a director.(See Sibex Construction(SA)(Pty)ltd v lnjectaseal CC 
1988 (2) SA 54(T) at 67 and Canadian Aero Servjces Ltd v O'Malley (1974) 40 DLR 
(3d) 371 (SCC). 
Going private can be defined as de-listing under the Listjng Regyjrements of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange once the company no longer complies with section 
5.6 contained in section I or where an application has been made for a de-listing in 
terms of rule 1 O in section II of the Listings Requirements. 
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debt levels, on the other. 
Secondly, the directors may identify, prior to the buy-out, regardless of the 
structure used, certain assets of the company which if re-deployed or sold, 
could add substantial value to the company, but only implement such 
strategies after the buy-out transaction is completed4• 
Lastly, the managers are the ultimate insiders as they are proxy to 
information not generally made available to the shareholders, thereby giving 
them an unfair advantage when buying the company5. 
A major critic of Management Buy-Outs, Benjamin Stein, argues that these 
conflicts are irreconcilable, particularly in the case of a listed company going 
private and that buy-outs should either be prohibited or heavily regulated. 
He calls buy-outs an ongoing national disgrace and that 11drastic federal 
action is needed, right now before investors are further abused and 
demoralized116• 
The purpose of this contribution is first, to discuss the various elements 
making up a Management Buy-Out in chapter 2; secondly, to analyse the 
problems referred to by the critics in chapter 3; thirdly, debating whether 
these conflicts are in fact irreconcilable and whether buy-outs should be 
prohibited or at least heavily regulated as suggested by the critics in chapter 
4; and lastly, to place the various problems specific to buy-outs into 
perspective and make certain recommendations in chapter 5. 
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BJ Stein 'Dear Mr Ruder Your View of Management MBO's is Simply Dead Wrong' 
(1989) Barrons 44. 
A Lipper 'LBO's Based on Insider Information' (1987) Venture 7. 
Ibid. This can be the case whether the shares or the assets are purchased. 
Stein op cit note 3 at 44. 
8 
Much of the material referred to, relates to the problems experienced in the 
United States and to some extent in the United Kingdom as regards 
Management Buy-Outs, however, the solutions to the problems that arise 
and arguments in favour of buy-outs have been analysed against the 
backdrop of the prevailing South African common law and statutory and 
regulatory provisions. 
2. MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS EXPLAINED 
2. 1 . Introduction 
A Management Buy-Out can be loosely defined as the purchase of a 
substantial shareholding in a company by a small team of managers with an 
entrepreneurial· outlook and a strong desire for management independence7. 
According to David Clutterbuck and Marion Devine in their book 
Management Buyouts8 there are four basic motives for participating in a 
buy-out, namely; Desperation (this may be due to changing markets and a 
change in the focus of the company leading to decreasing job security and 
satisfaction); Ambition (the manager is tired of the corporate environment 
and wants to work for himself); Frustration (the manager is being held back 
by staid, ineffecient and inflexible owners); and Opportunism (an opportunity 
arises to purchase the company and the managers take advantage of it). 
Regardless of the reasons for participating in a buy-out, it offers the capable 
management team a rare business opportunity to acquire control of a 
business they previously only managed (in some cases they may have had 
substantial equity stakes, but not real and effective control)9. It also offers 
them the chance of making a fortune once the debt is repaid and the 
7 
8 
9 
Management Buy-Outs' (1986) Finance Week Survey 4. 
D Clutterbuck and M Devine Management Buyouts (1987) 59. See also S Green 
'The Incentive Effects of Ownership and Control in Management Buy-Outs' (1988) 
21 Long Range Planning 26; · 
G White 'The Making of an MBO' (1986) 98 Accountancy 95 
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company is either re-sold or listed on the Stock Exchange. 
The buy-out is usually executed by using large amounts of debt and very 
little equity10 (sometimes referred to as a Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) because 
of the high gearing involved11 ). In order to gear up to the levels necessary 
to make the purchase with very little of their own equity, the managers have 
to rely on first, the assets of the company to secure the finance and second, 
its cash flow to service and repay the debt. 
2.2 History of management buy-outs 
2.2.1 United States 
Management Buy-Outs in the United States had its origins in the so called 
11 bootstrapping 11 deals of the 1960's, when a number of troubled, privately 
held companies were put back on their feet by innovative financiers who. 
raised funds using a company's cash flow as well as its assets12• As 
diversification, once regarded as a panacea for cyclical slumps, became to 
be regarded with scepticism in the early 1980s, more and more 
conglomerates wished to rid themselves of peripheral and non-performing 
assets. As a result, Management Buy-Outs became prevalent as an 
accepted method of achieving this end. Undervalued and underperforming 
companies were sold off to management who were transfixed by the idea of 
10 See paragraph 2.3.3.2 for a detailed explanation on the financial structuring of a 
buy-out. 
11 Gearing and Leverage are financial terms referring to the amount of debt an 
individual or a company acquires. For example, if a company has a great deal of 
debt relative to its equity, it is said to be highly geared or highly leveraged. 
12 C Ruffel 'Funds Galore for LBO Prospects' (1986} Euromoney-Special Survey: The 
Lucrative World of Management Buyouts 3. 
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equity stakes and shared profits and heartened by the availability of 
capital13. 
The buy-out market has grown exponentially since then, not only in the 
number of deals being effected but also in the incredible size of the 
buy-outs. The total annual dollar volume for Management Buy-Outs in the 
United States rose from less than $1 billion in 1980 to $11 billion in 1984 to 
some $43 billion in 198814. This was mainly due to the development of the 
junk bond market15 in the United States, which enabled managers to raise 
enormous amounts of money, for example, the AJA Nabisco buy-out team 
raised approximately $19 billion using junk bonds16 in order to effect the 
buy-out. 
2.2.2 United Kingdom 
Management Buy-Outs have become a major part of the United Kingdom 1s 
business and commercial landscape. As times have got tougher corporate 
managements have been looking harder at their portfolios of operating 
13 R Brooke 'Management Buy-Outs Give Industry a New Lease of Life' (1984) 
Industrial Management & Data Systems 6; see also S Birley 'Success and Failure 
in Management Buyouts' (1984) 17 Long Range Planning 32. 
14 L Lowenstein 'No More Cosy Buy-Outs' (1986) 64 Harvard Bysiness Review 149. 
15 
"Junk bonds" are nothing more than high interest rate loans or debentures which 
are generally not adequately secured by any assets or other form of security. There 
is in fact no real difference between junk bonds and unsecured debentures which 
are an established feature on the South African commercial scene as a means of 
raising finance. For further information regarding "junk bonds", see: S Solinga 
'LBO's, Junk Bonds and new Tax Laws' The Best of Buyouts (1982-1987) 171-l 75, 
R Pozdena 'Takeovers and Junk Bonds' The Best of Buyouts (1982-1987) 239, B D 
Fromson 'The Last Days of Drexel Burnam' (21 May 1990) Fortune 90 and G Yago 
Junk Bonds: How High Yield Securities Restructured America (1991) . 
16 H Randhawa 'PIK: A Way to Relieve LBO Concerns' (1990) 15 Accountancy 100. 
It must be noted that if too large a debt burden is taken on by the management or 
for that matter the company, the greater the danger of failure as any company can 
be ruined if too much is paid for it. (See J Whistler 'Avoiding the Pitfalls' The 
European Buy-Out Directory 1992 183.) 
11 
companies. The companies which are underperforming or no longer fit the 
parent's core business are simply sold off17. For this reason, the divestment 
of divisions and subsidiaries by domestically owned parent firms has 
become the principal source of buy-outs in the United Kingdom (some 60 -
80% of all buy-outs}18• The number of Buy-Outs of all sizes rose from about 
100 in 1980 to 340 in 1988, falling to 270 in 1989. In terms of amount, the 
United Kingdom's total grew from £300 million in 1984 to £6.4 billion in 
198919. It is submitted that in the light of the above statistics the buy-out 
market should continue to show growth in the future. 
2.2.3 South Africa 
In the past South Africa's main source of buy-outs had been the flurry of 
divestments in the mid-19801s by multi-national corporations, mainly due to 
the political pressure abroad. However, this source has now all but dried up 
after the sweeping political changes in South Africa. The main source of 
buy-outs now flows from a variety of corporate restructurings like 
Tongaat-Hulett selling off its transport arm Hultrans20• 
The total value of the South African buy-out market is approximately R300 
million per annum, which is relatively small compared to the United States 
and United Kingdom markets21 • 
17 R Upton 'Britains Buy-Out Boom' (1984) 16 Personnel Management 22. 
18 D C Gardner D C Gardner Workbook - Leverage and Management Buy-Outs (1990) 
5. 
19 Ibid. at 5 
20 A Rowe 'The Buy-Out Scene in South Africa' Management Buyouts, Leveraged 
Acquisitions and the Financial Entrepreneur 3 August 1989 FKV Conference 
Transcrjpts 3. 
21 This information was obtained from interviews conducted by the writer with Andre 
Roux, Vice President - Equity and Leveraged Capital Division of FirstCorp Merchant 
Bank Limited, for the purposes of completing this work. See also K Clarke 
'Managing the Deal' The Finance Week 200 Supplement (19-25 March 1992) 220 
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2.3. The making of a Management Buy-Out 
2.3.1. Circumstances where buy-outs may occur 
There are a number of circumstances which lend themselves to the 
possibility of a buy-out: 
2.3.1.1 
2.3.1.2 
2.3.1.3 
A parent company in financial difficulties may find it necessary 
to sell off profitable subsidiaries or divisions in order to raise 
cash. This often happens when a recession has caused a 
shortage of cash which has forced a company to sell parts of 
itself to its managers22• 
When a subsidiary is unable to meet group objectives and its 
activities have become peripheral to the mainstream business 
of the parent company. This usually occurs after a 
reassessment of a company's previous strategy of 
diversification and has now decided to concentrate on its core 
businesses23• 
The members of a private company may decide to retire or 
merely wish to sell. The majority shareholder may prefer to 
sell to a loyal management team, in the belief that the 
company will not be broken up but continue to retain its 
independence and continue to offer employment to its 
workforce24. 
for more information regarding buy-outs in South Africa. 
22 Anonymous 'Management buy-outs: Owner Occupiers' (1982) 285 The Economist 80. 
23 S Birley 'Success and Failure in Management Buyouts' (1984) 17 Long Range Planning 
32. 
24 G White 'The Making of an MBO' (1986) 98 Accoyntancy 95. 
2.3.1.4 
2.3.1.5 
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A foreign holding company may divest itself of its interest in a 
country, following economic or political upheaval25. 
The management of a listed company may wish to take a 
publicly owned company "private"26• 
2.3.2 Criteria for success 
2.3.2.1. Management criteria 
The most important criteria for success of any buy-out is that of 
a well motivated and able management team, as without it, the 
pressures of running the company and the financial risk could 
become to much for the team27• It is also essential for the 
management team to be well balanced and cover the whole 
range of management tasks, including sales, marketing, 
production and finance28• 
Senior management will almost always comprise a component 
of the buy-out team. This is even more important when one 
considers that one of the main conceptual foundations of the 
buy-out business is that managers who own their companies, 
work harder and more productively than those who are 
corporate employees 29. Most financiers agree that the most 
25 D Clutterbuck and M Devine Management Buyouts (1987) 5. 
26 R J Maupin and W A Label 'Profiting from a Management Buyout' (1987) 68 
Management Accounting 32. 
27 M Wright and J Coyne Management Buy-Outs (1986) 83. 
28 Clutterbuck op cit note 25 at 23. 
29 L Hecht 'Managers who Succeed as Bosses'(1986) Euromoney-Special Survey: The 
Lucrative World of Management Buyouts 38. See note 8 for further references dealing 
with this topic. 
2.3.2.2 
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important intangible element in a buy-out deal is the quality of 
the management team. There is a considerable reluctance to 
support buy-outs by independent investors, unless some of the 
principal managers agree to remain with and have an interest 
in the buy-out company30. 
Financial and business criteria 
The ideal candidate for a buy-out from both the vendor and 
purchaser perspective is a company that is profitable without 
any major business or management problems31 • It is submitted 
that if the buy-out is to succeed the company must be 
economically viable. This means it must be profitably 
managed, growing, relatively debt free, with a well established 
record. Financiers are not interested in deals which are based 
on ·management's expectations of turning the business around, 
cutting costs or re-organising production facilities32• 
Considering the excessive optimism and enthusiasm which so 
often dominate buy-outs, the management team could easily 
delude both themselves and their financial backers as to the 
prospects and capabilities of the management and the 
company33• Should this happen the financiers will have no 
certainty that the company is capable of generating sufficient 
cash flows to service34 the debt on schedule35. 
30 
'Management Buy-Outs' (1986) Finance Week Survey 4. 
31 D Thompson 'Buy-Outs and Buy-Ins: Europe's 1992 shows the big way for free trade' 
(1989) 53 Business Quarterly 45. 
32 
'Management Buy-outs' (1986) Finance Week Survey 5. 
33 Clutterbuck op cit note 25 at 36. 
34 The servicing of a debt means the timeous payment of the interest charge and the 
repayment of the capital instalments as per the financiers' terms. 
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Financiers also look at companies that hold a strong position in 
their market. A strong market share is generally associated 
with strong cash flows 36• These revenues must be immune to 
sudden reverses, changes in the market, intense competition 
and other pressures such as technological change37. It is 
submitted that a stable cash flow is vital as it both services and 
repays the debt. 
2.3.3 Structuring and Financing Management Buy-Out 
There is an infinite number of ways to structure and finance a Management 
Buy-Out transaction and no 'generic structure' will apply perfectly to any one 
transaction. The eventual structure will depend on various factors. These 
include the objectives of buyer, seller, lenders, investors and management, 
the purchase price, assets, cash flow, operating characteristics of the 
purchased business, and the relative bargaining positions and skills of the 
parties involved38• An attempt will therefore be made to explain only the 
most basic of principles involved. 
2.3.3.1 Structure 
Although some of the buy-out structures are exceptionally 
complex and intricate39 the basic thread running through these 
35 J Ormerod and I Burns Raising Venture Capital in the UK (1988) 56. 
36 Finance Week op cit note 30 at 5. 
37 A Seymore and J Maguire 'Leverage: The Opportunities for Industry' (1986) 
Euromoney Survey 32. 
36 G H Keven and C Rafferty 'Structuring and Financing an LBO: A Conceptual 
Approach' Buyouts: Directory of Financing Sources 5ed (1989) 27. 
39 See C Ruffel 'Funds Galore for LBO prospects' (1986) Euromoney-Special Survey: 
The Lucrative world of Management Buy-Outs 3 for a detailed examination of the 
$355 million buy-out of Houdille Industries in the United States in 1979. This buy-out 
is considered extremely complex even by today's standards. 
40 
41 
42 
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buy-out structures is simple, either the buy-out team purchases 
the company's shares or alternatively it purchases the assets 
of the company. 
a) Purchasing the shares 
When the buy-out team decides to purchase the shares of the 
company, rather than the assets, they will acquire a total 
package of rights and obligations, assets and liabilities40• Due 
to the unique method of financing a buy-out, that is using 
assets and cash flows of the company to service the debt, the 
potential of breaching capital maintenance provisions becomes 
pre-eminent41 when purchasing the shares. 
In South Africa, for example, the provisions of section 38 deals 
with this issue42. A buy-out team would, therefore, not be 
I Krieger Management Buy-outs (1990) 130. 
M Katz 'How to optimise the tax, accounting and legal issues in a Management 
Buyout' Management Buyouts, Leveraged Acquisitions and the Financial 
Entrepreneur 3 August 1989 FKV Conference 50 
Section 38 of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended, provides that 
accompany is prohibited from giving, whether directly or indirectly and whether by 
means of a loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise, any financial 
assistance for the purpose of or in connection with a purchase or subscription made 
or to be made by any person of or for the shares of the company. In the United 
Kingdom, section 151 of the Companies Act 1985 provides for the same prohibition, 
however, in the United States the assistance by a company to purchase its shares 
is permitted by common law. (See footenote 55 of L C B Gower Gower's Principles 
of Company Law 4ed (1979) 225 for reference to the position in the United States 
and 225-236 of his work for the position in the United Kingdom.). For further 
discussions on the prohibition in South Africa see J P G Lessing 'Maintenance of 
Share Capital' (1991) 4 The Law of South Africa 71 - 85 for an excellent overview of 
the principles involved in the interpretation of section 38. See also M Larkin 
'Financial Assistance for the Acquisition of Shares' (1981) 11 Businessmans Law 5; 
H S Cilliers and M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 383-391; M G Fredman 
'Financial Assistance after Lipschitz' (1983) 12 Businessmans Law 138; M G 
Fredman 'Financial Assistance II' (1983) 12 Businessmans Law 183; MG Fredman 
'Financial Assistance Ill' (1983) 13 Businessmans Law 25; MG Fredman 'Financial 
Assistance IV' (1983) 13 Businessmans Law 50; Anonymous 'S 38 Financial 
Assistance-The AD Judgement in the UDC Case' (1979) SACLJ F-1 to F-17; and 
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permitted to use the company's assets as security to purchase 
the shares of the company. This often leads the team to · 
devise complicated, yet legal, structures to achieve the same 
effect. Due to the complexity of effecting these structures, the 
financiers would generally prefer not to use this method unless 
the target or buy-out company has a substantial assessed loss 
or has a non-transferable trade mark or patent which would 
necessitate keeping the company intact and thereby offset the 
disadvantages of this structure. (See Diagram 1 along with the 
narrative which sets out the basic structure should the 
management team opt to purchase the shares of the target 
company). 
Diagram 1 
Management Investors 
,...-------
~ • ....mtut. 
-...~.-h 
Seniot .-.cl ....nn. 
Shares 
st-•.,.,. rmuo.d to 
no-W..,.....nd 
t•Hnuppm1..,. 
..,_ .... 
J*1...,by...,..t-
dtlbtmtd--• 
to...,.....__ 
Shareholders 
Loan Accounts 
I 
Assets 
Anonymous 'S 38 Financial Assistance by Dividend Decleration' (1979) SACLJ F-17 
to F-26. 
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Narrative 
This structure is most effective when the buy-out company is 
thinly capitalised43 and has large shareholders loans. Where 
the shareholders loans are not very large but the company has 
large distributable reserves, the company may declare 
dividends to its shareholders and, instead of paying the 
dividend44, credits their loan accounts. The management would 
then purchase the loan accounts and use the company's 
assets to to secure the loans. 
Although this would at first blush appear to contravene the· 
provisions of section 38, this practice was expressly permitted 
in Lipschitz v UDC Bank45• The court could find no objection to 
the substitution of the loan accounts with other debt as the 
statute specifically prohibits assistance being given to purchase 
the shares and is silent as regards loan accounts. In order not 
to fall foul with the prohibition, the balance of the purchase 
price, namely, the nominal value of the shares remaining after 
the dividends had been credited to the loan accounts, would 
have to be financed by way of unsecured debt, usually 
preference shares or convertible debentures. 
43 When a company is thinly capitalised it means that there are relatively few shares 
issued and those that have been issued are of a low nominal value. 
44 In Novick v Comair Holdings Limited 1979 (2) 116 (W), it was held that a company 
may declare a dividend out of undistributed profit and credit the loan accounts of the 
shareholders acquiring the company. It is submitted that if this is the case, there 
can be no objection to the company crediting existing shareholders' loan accounts 
instead of paying a dividend, thereafter allowing the management to substitute the 
loan accounts with secured bank loans and using it to pay the shareholders. · 
45 1979 (1) SA 789 (A). See also the following line of cases: Gradwell v Rostra 
Printers 1959 (4) SA 419 (A); Evrard v Ross 1977 2 SA 311 (D); Zentland Holdings 
(Pty) Ltd v Saambou Nasionale Bouvereeniging 1979 (4) SA 574 (C). 
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b) Purchasing the assets 
When a buy-out team purchases the assets of a company it 
will be in a position to select the rights and assets they require 
and leave behind the obligations and liabilities which they do 
not46• This method is most often used in jurisdictions which 
have capital maintenance requirements. The buy-out is 
effected by selling all or some of the assets of the existing 
company to an existing company or to a new entity47• 
(Diagram 2 and the narrative below sets out the process) 
Diagram 2 
Shereholdera 
MBO 
co 
46 I Krieger Management Buy-outs (1990) 130. 
'°" 
..__,....__ .... ......, __   
__.,. ,_ ...... 
.-wi4mlly1Mf....._. 
47 
'Management Buy-outs' (1986) Finance Week Survey 8. 
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Narrative to Diagram 2 
The buy-out team would have to incorporate a new company 
(Newco) and use it as a vehicle to acquire the assets from the 
target buy-out company. After the sale, the buy-out company1s 
only asset would be cash, and is commonly known as a cash 
shell. The cash would then be distributed to the cash shell's 
shareholders (once all liabilities have been settled) by way of a 
dividend or where the distributable reserves have been 
exhausted, by way of a reduction of capital48• The financiers 
would provide finance to Newco in order to make the purchase. 
They would in this case, however, be in a position to secure 
their exposure by using the assets purchased by Newco as 
security by way of a mortgage or notarial bond49 without 
48 The reduction of capital would be effected in terms section 83 (if no creditors exist) 
or section 84 (if there are creditors the sanction of the court is required) of the 
Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended. 
49 There are a number of bonds which can be used to secure the assets of a 
company. First, where immovable property is involved, a mortgage bond is usually 
passed over property which is generally the most secure form of security. In order 
to secure movables the process becomes somewhat more complex. A notarial 
bond is usually passed over the movable assets which can be either be a covering 
bond or a Natal Bond (this depends on the location of the company and must 
comply with the provisions of the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act 18 of 1932). A 
covering bond may either be general or special, but can only be used before the 
debt arises. See the recent Appellate Division case of Brian St Clair Cooper N.0. 
and others v The Master of the Supreme Court (OFS) and another 1992 (3) 60 (A) 
which has seriously effected the security of a special notarial bondholder, 
mortgaging specified movable assets, in the event of a liquidation. The court held 
that unless the mortgagee is in posssesion of the assets on insolvency of the 
morgagor, the bond does not confer any preference in respect of the bondholders 
claim against the mortgagor. 
This latest case does not effect a Natal Bond which has far greater legal effect. 
Movables in that province, which have been specially hypothecated by notarial bond 
are, subject to a landlords hypothec, deemed to have been pledged to the holder of 
the bond in the same manner as if they had been delivered to him as a pledge. The 
goods and other movables must be specifically described and enumerated, so that 
they may be identified in a moment. (See J F Coaker and D T Zeffertt Wille and 
Millin Mercantile Law of South Africa 18ed (1984) 374-413 for a comprehensive 
discussion on bonds.) 
2.3.3.2 
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contravening any capital maintenance provisions. The income 
stream generated by Newco would be used to pay the inter.est 
charge and repay the capital amount. 
Financing 
The special characteristics of buy-outs is that the financiers 
provide the bulk of the funds but take a disproportionately 
small portion of the equity; on the other hand, the buy-out team 
obtains a large share of the equity but provides a small portion 
of the funding50. 
In most deals, the financial package will consist of a mixture of 
equity and debt. The key to every successful buy-out is 
arranging the correct balance between the basic financing 
elements, namely: the senior debt, the subordinated debt and 
the equity51, all of which represent differing risks and rewards52• 
The major portion of financing in a buy-out will usually consist 
50 Thompson op cit note 31 at 42. Most financiers will require that the management 
sign personal suretyships for the loans provided to effect the buy-out. Although 
there is usually little chance of the management being in a position to honour these 
personal suretyships, the financiers believe that the very real possibility of a 
manager losing his life's savings, should the buy-out fail, lends added impetus to his 
endeavours to make the transaction work. (See Roux op cit note 21 ). 
51 S Quickel 'Warnings Fail to Dim LBO Dazzle' (1986) Euromoney Survey: The 
Lucrative world of Management Buy-Outs 25. The characteristics of Senior Debt, 
Mezzanine Debt and Equity are set out in notes 53, 57 and 63 respectively. 
52 For a discussion on risk and reward relative to the various financing alternatives see 
G H Keven and C Rafferty 'Structuring and Financing an LBO: A Conceptual 
Approach' 5ed Buyouts: Directory of Financing Sources (1989) 27. 
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of 11senior debt1153 normally between ± 50% - 60%. 11 Senior 
debt11 usually consists of secured term loans54 repayable over 5 
to 7 years. Due the exceptionally high gearing involved it is 
not unusual to see an interest moratorium55 for the first year so 
as to allow the company's cash flow to stabilise after the 
buy-out56• 
11Junior or mezzanine debt"57, usually makes up ± 30% - 40% 
of the financing. It is generally a loan which is subordinated to 
the "senior debt 11 • Although it is subordinated to the 11senior 
debt 11 it is structured so as to rank above the concurrent 
creditors in the event of a liquidation of the company. This is 
usually done by way of an inter-creditor agreement in whic~ 
the senior and junior lenders agree their respective rights and 
rankings58• The careful structuring of subordinated debt has 
become imperative in the light of the recent judgement by 
Stegmann J in Ex Parte de Villiers NNO: In Re Carbon 
53 Senior debt is usually secured by way of collateral which may consist of a mortgage 
bond over the immovable assets of the company and a notarial bond over the 
company's movable assets. See L Blackstone and D Franks Guide to Management 
Buy-Outs {1986) 11 O for a discussion regarding the types of security on which 
senior debt lenders can rely. 
54 Term loans are loans which are to be repaid over a fixed period of time. The loan 
may have a fixed interest rate which means that the interest rate remains 
unchanged for the duration of the loan; or the loan may have floating interest rate 
which means that the interest rate is linked to the prime overdraft rate and thus 
fluctuates as and when the overdraft draft moves. 
55 This simply means that no interest is payable on the debt for a period of time and is 
added to the capital amount and is repaid later. 
56 I Krieger Management Buy-outs (1990) 25. 
57 Junior or mezzanine debt (it is sometimes referred to as mezzanine debt because it 
bridges the gap between equity and "senior debt") is nothing more than 
inadequately secured high interest rate loans, which is similar to the North American 
junk bonds. See note 15 for an explanation of junk bonds. 
58 Krieger op cit note 56 at 25. 
59 
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Developments (Pty} Limited (in Liguidation}59• In his judgement 
Stegmann J held, inter alia, that subordination or "back 
ranking" agreements are invalid if they attempt to re-arrange 
the statutory claims in a concursus creditorum60• It is 
submitted, therefore, that in order to ensure the validity of the 
subordination agreements the transaction must be structured in 
such a way so as to comply with the statutory ranking of 
claims61 The "junior debt" usually has a much higher interest 
rate than that of the senior debt. The reason being that the 
providers of 11mezzanine finance" take a greater risk than 
secured lenders and accordingly require a higher return62• 
The remainder of the financing will take the form of equity63• 
The permutations of equity finance are enormous. The basic 
ordinary share ranks for dividend and repayment of capital 
behind virtually every other type of finance. This type of equity 
is usually attributable to the management team. Ranking 
ahead of the ordinary share is the preference share64• The 
1992 (2) SA 95 01/). 
60 See text at 119E-122H. See also Lind v Lefdal's Pianos Ltd (in Liguidation) and 
Others 1929 TPD 241 referred to by Stegmann J in his judgement. 
61 In order to validly subordinate the mezzanine debt to the senior debt and ranking 
ahead of the claims of the concurrent creditors, by way of an example, it would be 
necessary for the financier providing the mezzanine debt to become a second · 
bondholder over the assets of the company. Thereby complying with the statutory 
ranking as required by Stegmann J. 
62 The interest rate payable on any loan is a function of the perceived risk of 
non-payment of the loan. This simply means that the higher the risk of 
non-payment the higher the interest rate. See note 52. 
63 Equity is essentially ownership. It is normally permanent and it is the highest risk 
finance. The equity shareholder has a right to income after all providers of finance 
have taken their return, and a right to whatever assets of the business remain after 
other providers of finance and creditors have been repaid (See I Krieger 
Management Buy-outs 23-24). 
R R Pennington Pennington's Company Law 6ed (1990) 206-216. 
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preference share usually carries a fixed dividend which is 
cumulative, that is if there are insufficient profits to distribute in 
any one period the right to the dividend is carried forward until 
the company does have sufficient distributable capital65• The 
preference shareholder's rights rank behind providers of debt 
and trade or other creditors and, if specifically provided for, 
before ordinary shareholders66• Usually the lending institution 
or financiers will take either preference shares (there are a 
number of combinations they can use, for example convertible 
preference shares, redeemable preference shares, convertible 
participating preference shares, etc67 or covertible debentures. 
This will allow them to rank ahead of the management's 
shares68, as well as benefiting from any future capital growth69. 
The following diagram graphically depicts the various layers of 
financing and levels of preference in the event of a liquidation. 
65 I bid at 207-209. 
66 Krieger op cit note 56 at 23. See the following cases relating to the rights of 
preference shareholders upon liquidation. See Ex parte Betty: In re First Mutual 
Investment Trust Ltd 1974 (1) SA 127 fYV); Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Anglo Transvaal Collieries Ltd and Others 1983 (3) SA 96 (A) and J L Sher 'The 
Rights of Preference Shareholders: A Re-Examination' (1983) 7 SACLJ 87 
67 See L C B Gower Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4ed (1979) 412-423 
and H S Cilliers and M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 153-158 for discussions 
on the various types of preference shares. 
68 
'Management Buy-outs' (1987) Fjnancial Mail Supplement 12. 
69 The fact that the financiers take an equity stake in the company makes a buy-out 
unique relative to other lending transactions. By providing loan and equity finance 
the financier not only earns interest income but also participates in the future 
prosperity of the company by way of divid~nds and capital growth which is 
concomitant with equity funding. 
70 
71 
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In the event of insolvency of the buy-out company its assets 
may fall into either the category of "free residue" or "secured". 
Free residue is defined as that portion of an insolvent estate 
which is not subject to any right of preference by reason of any 
special mortgage, legal hypotheca, pledge or right of 
retention70• The senior and junior lender will usually fall within 
the secured category and thus rank ahead of concurrent 
creditors71 (this is of course assuming the buy-out has been 
D Shrand The Law and Practice of Insolvency Winding Up of Companies and 
Judicial Management (1977) 126. See also Ede la Rey Mars: The Law of 
Insolvency in South Africa Bed 366-388 for discussions on the definitions of secured 
and preferent creditors as well as the various types of securities and the rights 
attaching to them. 
See P Wood The Law of Subordinated Debt (1990) 50-71 for references relating to 
inter-lender agreements in jurisdictions outside South Africa. This work contains a 
detailed examination of the subordination of debt, subordination agreements, various 
classes of subordination and the distinctions between senior and junior debt. See 
Shrand op cit note 70 at 129 for the nature of the various types of security available 
to the senior and junior lender. See Ex parte De Villiers 1992 (2) SA 95 (W) for the 
courts attitude on subordination agreements and inter-lender agreements. See also 
footnote 61 for an explanation of how subordination of debt could validly be effected 
in South Africa. 
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structured to allow for this7~. Equity holders on the other hand 
will not only rank behind the senior and junior lenders but also 
behind all other concurrent and contingent creditors73. Thus it is 
unlikely that the management team will recieve any payout 
should the buy-out fail and the company liquidated. 
2.3.4 Exiting from the buy-out 
Raising finance and then servicing the debt is not the end of the transaction. 
Very often, at some point, the original investors in a Management Buy-Out 
will seek to realise their investment. When, how and for how much depends 
on a number of factors, inter alia, the historic growth rate of the company, 
the competence of the management team, the maturity of the company and 
the continuing acceptance of the company•s products in the market place74• 
Investing institutions and in some cases the original management may seek 
a complete exit where the deal has been less than successful, or where 
future growth rates appear to be tailing off and more attractive investments 
are available elsewhere. Institutions generally view a buy-out as a five to 
seven year investment. The period is not strictly adhered to and is largely 
dependent on prevailing circumstances, the success of the buy-out and the 
institution•s investment criteria75. 
In the event of the investors in the buy-out, whether management or 
financiers, wanting to realise their investment, they have the option of 
disposing of all or a portion of their shares to the other members of the 
management team or to a third party or they may list the company on the 
72 See 2.3.3.1 for a discussion on how to structure a buy-out. 
73 See section 342 of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended. 
74 I Krieger Management Buy-outs (1990) 42. 
75 Roux op cit note 21. 
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Stock Exchange76• This latter option would entail offering a portion of the 
management and financier 1s shares to the the public for cash. This would 
generally leave the management and the financiers, if they so wish, with a 
much reduced shareholding in the in a publicly listed company. But this 
enables them to raise capital from the public in the future for expansion if 
necessary. 
A successful buy-out can sometimes mean big returns and an unsuccessful 
one big losses due to the high levels of debt incurred to effect the buy-out. 
Some of the returns on the successful buy-outs are so disproportionately 
large relative to the initial investment, that it is little wonder that some former 
shareholders feel they have somehow been cheated. An excellent example 
of the kind of returns made, particularly in the United States, is that of 
Gibson Greeting Cards. This buy-out was led by Wesray Capital which 
bought Gibson from RCA for $80 million, putting up only $1 million of its own 
capital. A year and a half later the buy-out group took the company public 
again in an offering that valued Gibson at $290 million. William Simon, the 
chief executive officer, saw his personal stake of $330 000 transformed into 
$66 million in cash and stock77. These returns seem almost unbelievable 
and it is returns such as these that has angered the critics. 
3. CRITICISMS OF MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Management Buy-Outs earned a good reputation in the late 19701s and early 
19801s as a means of saving failing divisions and companies. More recently 
however, larger buy-outs and larger profits for the buy-out team have 
76 For an in depth discussion on flotation of buy-out companies, reference is made to 
the book by M Wright, K Robbie and J Coyne Flotation of Management Buy-Outs 
(1987). 
77 L Hecht 'Message in Gibson Greeting Cards' (1986) Euromoney Survey 35. 
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brought that reputation into question78. A former commissioner of the United 
States Securities Exchange Commission had this to say about "going 
private" buy-out transactions: 
"What is happening is, in my estimation, serious, unfair and sometimes 
disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public financing, and a 
course that inevitably is going to make the individual shareholder even more 
hostile to American corporate mores and the securities markets than he 
already is"79. 
The main criticism to buy-outs is about fairness to shareholders. Critics like 
Stein and Lipper8° find it difficult to see how management members of the 
buy-out team can serve effectively as fiduciaries of the selling shareholders 
and at the same time negotiate on their own behalf as buyers of the assets 
or business of the company. They claim that there is an inevitable breach of 
fiduciary duty arising from the irreconcilable conflict of interest facing the· 
members of the buy-out team. Furthermore, they see the managers as the 
ultimate insiders, proxy to information not made available to the 
shareholders and therefore giving the buy-out team an unfair advantage81 • 
78 K M Davidson 'Another look at LBO's' (1988) 9 The Joyrnal of Business Strategy 
44. 
79 R F Bruner and L S Paine 'Management Buy-Outs and Managerial Ethics' (1988) 
30 California Management Review 89. 
80 B J Stein 'Going private is unethical' (1985) Nov Fortune 137 and A Lipper 'LBO's 
Based on Insider lnformation'(1987) Aug Venture 7. 
81 SJ Naude' Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur Met Besondere verwysing 
na die lnterne Maaatskapyverband (Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of South 
Africa, 1969) 200 et seg for his views on the question of the abuse of inside 
information and its relevance to directors. 
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3.2 Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
3.2.1 Introduction 
A company is an artificial legal entity with its own legal persona82, separate 
from its physical assets, members and workers. It has no body or corpus 
and must therefore operate exclusively through the medium of its directors, 
officers and employees83. A director has been defined as a person who 
directs the affairs of the company84• There are two classes of directors 
namely, outside (non-executive) directors85 and inside (executive) directors86. 
They have been distinguished them as follows: 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
0 Britzius South Afrjcan Company Secretarial Practice (1988) 3. See also M P .I 
Larkin 'Introduction and Formation to and of Companies'(1991) 4 The Law of South 
Africa 19-25 for a concise illustration of the corporate personality. See also ../ 
Salomon v Salomon and Company All E R 33; (1897] AC 22; Dadoo v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council 1920 AD 530; and Lee v Lee's Air Farming Ltd (1960] All ER 
420; Privy Council [1961] AC 12 for the relevant case law in this regard. 
H S Cilliers and M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 4. See the the judgement 
of Denning L J in H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd [1956] 
All E R 624 and Watermeyer J in Estate Kootcher v Commissioner for Inland 
Revenue [1941] AD 256 wherein they liken a company to a human body. 
The Companies Act defines a director as including any person occupying the 
position of director or alternate director of a company, by whatever name he may be 
designated. P Meskin in his book Henochsbera on the Companies Act 4ed (1985) 
9 argues that a director must be someone who has been appointed in that office by 
those in the company having power of appointment of directors (R v Mall 1959 (4) 
SA 607 (N) at 624 and S v Vandenberg 1979 (1) SA 208 (D) at 216 to 217) or if he 
is deemed to be a director in terms section 208(2)of the Companies Act (No.61 of 
1973) as amended. 
See C Dillon The Non-Executive Director in Modern Company Law (Unpublished 
LLM Thesis, University of South Africa, 1986) for an overview of the duties of 
non-executive directors in South Africa. 
J T Pretorius (Ed) Hahlo's South African Company Law Through the Cases 5ed 
(1991) 327. In the case of Cronje NO v Stone en 'n ander 1985 (3) SA 597 the 
distinction between executive and non-executive directors has been significantly 
curtailed. A non-executive director can now no longer proclaim to be unaccountable 
for vagrancies of his fellow exexcutive directors. If the court finds that the 
non-executive director has been dilatory in carrying out his duties, subject to certain 
latitudes, he could be be held accountable along with the other directors. See also 
Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgenson 1980 (4) SA 156 f.YV) 
which deals with the same issues. 
/ 
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'~s a rule, the former attend and vote at meetings of the board, but do not 
work tu/I-time for the company and have no service contract, whereas the 
latter have a service contract under which they work tu/I-time for the 
company'67• 
In the context of Management Buy-Outs we are principally concerned with 
executive directors88 . The office of director, whether executive or 
non-executive, is a fiduciary one89• The law relating to the fiduciary 
relationship of directors is clear; in their fiduciary position vis-'a-vis the 
company, the directors may not place themselves in a position in which 
there is a conflict between their duties to the company and their personal 
interests. Where such a conflict arises it will lead to a breach of a director's 
fiduciary duty90. 
87 J T Pretorius (Ed) Hahlo's South African Company Law Through the Cases 5ed 
(1991) 327. 
88 The reason is simply that executive directors are more likely than non-executive 
directors to form part of the buy-out team as they are actively involved in the day to 
day running of the business. 
89 J F Corkery Director's Powers and Duties (1987) 55. See also H S Cilliers and 
M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 327-328 and 0 Britzius South African 
Secretarial Practice (1988) 84 for the position in South Africa. 
90 0 Britzius South African Secretarial Practice (1988) 84. See also M S Blackman The 
Fiduciazy Doctrine and its Application to Directors of Companies (1970) 275; H S Cilliers 
and M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 327 and S J Naude' 'Die Regsposisie van die 
Maatskappy direkteur (1969) 159-187. Reference is made to Robinson v Randfontein 
Estates Gold Mining Company Ltd 1921 AD 168 at 179-180, Atlas Organic Fertilisers 
(Pty) Ltd v Pik1sewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) at 197-199; Bellairs v 
Hodnett 1978 (1) SA 1109 (A) at 1126-1134 and Sibex Construction CSA) (pty) Ltd v 
Injectaseal CC 1988 (2) SA 54 (T) which are some of the leading cases dealing with the 
fiduciary duties of directors. 
v 
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3.2.2. Conflicts of Interest 
3.2.2.1 
91 
Introduction 
In the case of Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining 
Ltd91 it was held by Innes CJ that: 
"Where one man stands to another in a position of confidence 
involving a duty to protect the interests of that other, he is not 
allowed to make a secret profit at the other's expense or place 
himself in a position where his interests conflict with his duty". 
The critics argue that the buy-out process must, by its very 
nature, inevitably lead to irreconcilable conflicts of interest and 
consequently a breach of fiduciary duty 92. It is submitted that 
the two main conflicts which arise are, first, that the directofs 
cannot, as a result of their interest in the transaction, be 
impartial. The legal consequences of this partiality will depend 
on the ultimate structure of the buy-out. Where the assets of 
the company are purchased the directors are in direct breach 
of their fiduciary duties to the company. This arises as a result 
of the directors being duty bound to obtain the best possible 
price for the assets, yet, as potential purchasers in a buy-out 
transaction, wanting the lowest possible price in order to 
service the enormously high debt levels. In this case only the 
company and not the shareholders has a remedy in the event 
of a breach of fiduciary occuring. 
1921 AD 168. See also Aberdeen Railway Company v Blaikie Bros 1854 1 Macq 
461 at 471 - 472, [1954] 2 All E R 1281. 
92 BJ Stein 'Going Private is Unethical' (1985) Fortune 137. 
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Where the buy-out team purchases the shares of the company 
as apposed to the assets, the conflict is somewhat different. 
The conflict is between the directors and the shareholders and 
not between the directors and the company. In Percival v 
Wright93 Swinfen Eady J held that directors do not have a 
fiduciary duty to individual shareholders when purchasing 
shares94 and as such need make no disclosure to shareholders 
of " ... a large casual profit, the discovery of a new vein, or the 
prospect of a good dividend in the immediate future ... " 
It is submitted that in the light of the above case, where the 
buy-out team purchases the shares of the company, it cannot 
be said that there is a breach of fiduciary duty95• However, 
where the directors are privy to unpublished price sensitive 
information not disclosed to the shareholders or to the public at 
large and trade in the company's shares, they will fall foul of 
anti-insider trading regulations, which is dealt with in 4.4 below. 
Secondly, the directors may identify, prior to the buy-out, 
certain assets of the company which, if re-deployed or sold, 
could add substantial value to the company, but only 
93 [1902] 2 Ch 421. 
94 In Allen v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444, however, the directors were held accountable 
to the shareholders on the basis of misrepresenting the affairs of the company in 
order to induce the shareholders to sell their shares to them. The court held that in 
the specific circumstances of the case the directors were acting as agents for the 
shareholders and were consequently accountable for the profit which they had 
improperly obtained. See also R R Pennington Penningtons's Company Law 6ed 
(1990) 609-611. 
95 See S J Naude' Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur (1969) 200-215. 
v 
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implement such strategies after the transaction is completed96• 
It is submitted that these conflicts could lead to the 
management team failing to pay a fair price to the erstwhil~ 
shareholders; and this in turn could lead to secret profits being 
made by the management team as a result of the team's self 
interest. 
Fair price 
It is submitted that there can be no argument against the fact 
that in a non-arms length transaction the temptation always 
exists not to pay a fair price97 for the assets or alternatively the 
96 The company director is under a general duty to act honestly in the best interests of 
the company. However, this duty is not as onerous as it at first seems. The courts 
have attributed a low standard of care in deciding whether or not the director has in 
fact done so. The director is not expected to have special skills other than he 
already has, provided he acts honestly. See LC B Gower Gower's Principles of 
Modern Company Law 4ed (1979) 576-580, 0 Britzius South African Company 
Secretarial Practice (1988) 94-95 and R R Pennington Pennington's Company Law 
6ed (1990) 600-603. For the relevant case law in this regard see Lagunas Nitrate 
Co v Lagunas Syndicate (1899] 2 Ch 392, Parke v Daily News Ltd (1962] 2 All E R 
929 and Fisheries Development Corporation of S A Ltd v Jorgenson 1980 (4) SA 
156 0/V). 
97 The term fair price is far more complicated than it at first appears and very difficult 
ascertain. Value is a subjective concept and the value of an interest in an 
enterprise to one investor may differ from the value to another investor (See 
Merchant Bankers Association Working Paper on Valuations 21 February 1992 Ref 
No:8062/MA 06). This is not the the only problem, before the the value of the 
enterprise can be determined, the type of value must be ascertained. There are 
many different types of value. The most commonly used terms are the Going 
Concern Value, Liquidation Value and Market Value. The Going Concern Value is 
generally attributed to a an enterprise which has an established plant or business 
with its earning power already partly or entirely matured. Liquidation Value is the 
value placed on the net amount realisable on the assets in the event of bankruptcy 
or liquidation. This basis of valuation recognises that so called "distress 
merchandise" realises less than fair market value. Market Value can be further 
sub-divided into Open Market Value, Notional Market Value and Fair Market Value. 
Open Market Value is usually the price negotiated between a vendor and a 
purchaser acting at arms length. The Notional Value is a value attributed to an 
enterprise in the absence of Open Market Valuations (e.g negotiations between 
non-arms length parties) by making certain assumptions of what a fair price should 
be. Fair Market Value is the highest price available estimated in terms of money 
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shares of the company, particularly in a buy-out situation. 
To mitigate the appearance of such self dealing in these 
non-arms length acquisitions, managers virtually always 
engage an investment banker to express an independent 
opinion that the buy-out compensation represents fair value98• 
Stein argues that this is insufficient99• He avers that the 
investment banker cannot be trusted to give a truly 
independent opinion on whether the price for the business or 
its shares is fair and reasonable. This is particularly the case 
when an offer is being made for the buy-out company as a 
going concern, regardless of whether the shares or the assets 
is being purchased. He suggests that either they see it as an 
opportunity to make money or they are not given sufficient 
information to form an opinion. He is clearly not the only one 
who believes this, considering the amount of "fair 
compensation" litigation that is generated in the United States 
following buy-out bids. The public shareholders claim that the 
management team's informational advantages are not available 
which a willing seller may obtain for the property in an open and unrestricted market 
from a willing, knowledgeable purchaser acting at arms length. See I Cambell 
Canadian Valuation Service (1991) 4-20B. See also P Feinberg 'The Price of 
Industry' (1990) 19 Businessman's Law 129; T Copeland Valuation: Measuring and 
Managjng the Valye of Companies (1990), O G Sexton 'Measuring the Value Gap: 
A Survival Exercise for Management' (1989) 2 M & A Europe 33 and J T Pretorius 
(Ed) Hahlo's South African Company Law Through the Cases 5ed (1991) 187-193 
for further reading on this topic. For the relevant case law relating to valuaions see 
Jones v Jones [1971] All ER 676, Dublin v Diner 1964 (1) SA 799, Estate Milne v 
Donohoe Investments (Pty) ltd 1967 (2) SA 359 (A), Donaldson Investments (Pty) 
ltd v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1979 (3) SA 713; confirmed on appeal 1980 (4) 
SA 204 (T); and on further appeal 1983 (3) SA 93 (A), and Ex parte Macey's Stores 
ltd 1983 (2) SA 657 (Z). 
98 LE De Angelo 'Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of 
Management Buy-Outs of Public Stockholders'(1986) 61 Accounting Review 400. 
99 B J Stein 'Going Private is Unethical' Fortune 138. 
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to the appointed investment bankers or to the shareholders 100• 
Apart from the informational disadvantages suffered by the 
investment banker and the shareholder, a far more serious 
allegation is levelled at the directors. It has been alleged, not 
only by Stein and Lipper, that because the investment banks 
and courts rely heavily on the capitalised earnings method of 
valuation 101 , the managers are in a unique position to 
manipulate the earnings. The Wall Street Journal102 voiced its 
concerns in the following item-
"Regulators and some businessmen are concerned about 
management's ability to manipulate financial results to make a 
leveraged buy-out easier or cheaper. Such manipulation could 
involve holding down current earnings and strengthening future 
profits by making costly improvements to plant and equipment 
or by introducing more conseNative accounting procedures. " 
It is is submitted that, if this were in fact the case, management 
would be in a position to offer what appears to be a healthy 
100 H De Angelo and L E De Angelo 'Management Buy-Outs of Publicly Traded 
Corporations' (1987) 33 Financial Analysts Journal 47. 
101 The capitalised earnings method of valuation of the company, regardless of whether 
the business or the shares are being valued, takes the following form: The historic 
earnings of the company are normalised (that is any extra-ordinary items are either 
added back or subtracted depending on their nature) and weighted to the extent to 
which they are sustainable. This generally means that the most recent results and 
forecasts are accorded the heaviest weighting. Once this figure is obtained, a price 
earnings multiple (a figure calculated to indicate how many years it will take the 
investor to recoup his investment at the company's present after tax earnings) is 
then applied to this figure (the multiple is generally based on comparable companies 
on the Stock Exchange). The result would theoretically be the value of the 
company. For a more in-depth discussion relating to the capitalised earnings 
method of valution see D Clutterbuck and M Devine Management Buyouts 49-52, I 
Krieger Management Buy-outs 17-19 and L Blackstone and D Franks Guide to 
Management Buy-Outs 1986-1987 12. 
102 29 December 1983 1. 
3.2.2.3. 
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premium to the market price, when in fact the market price 
does not reflect the true potential of the company103• This 
means that even if the company is put out to tender (after the 
buy-out bid is made), the quality of the information is such that 
the management team could no doubt still be in a position to 
offer the higher price, confident in the knowledge that it could 
recoup it at a later stage. Therefore, the management have an 
unfair advantage over its shareholders and, in the case of an 
auction sale or tender offer, over other bidders. 
Self interest and secret profits 
The issues raised by self interest and secret profits vary 
depending on whether the assets or the shares of the company 
are purchased. If the shares are purchased and the managers 
are privy to information not available to the public there is no 
breach of fiduciary duty in the true sense of the word104• The 
managers have no fiduciary duty to the shareholders, only to 
the company itself. The rules governing this instance 
103 There appears to be no reason why, in South African law, a company's auditors 
could not be held liable to third parties for negligence if the financial position of the 
company was incorrectly reported, as long as the necessary negligence or intent is 
proved. See HS Cilliers and M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 497-539, J T 
Pretorius Hahlo's South African Company Law Through the Cases 5ed (1991) 
603-646 and S Trusswell and H Norval 'Preventing Corporate Fraud' (1989) 19 
Businessman's Law 31, J T Pretorius Aanspreeklikheid van die 
Maatskapgy-Ouditeure tenoor derdes og grand van Wanvoorstelling van Finansiele 
State (1985) 396ff and C R Cookson and D J McQuoid - Mason 'Twentieth Century 
Auditors: Watchdogs, Bloodhounds or Crossbreeds?' 1975 Natal University LR 164 
for more details on the South African position. In regards to the position in the 
United Kingdom reference is made to the article by K P E Lasok and E Grace 'The 
True and Fair View' (1989) 1 O Company Lawyer 13. This article also explores the 
effect of the true and fair criteria on the issue of creative accounting. See the 
following cases in this regard Lipschitz v Wolpert 1977 (2) SA 732 (A), Pacific 
Acceptance Corporation Ltd v Forsyth (1970) 92 WN (NSW) 29, Tonkwane Sawmill 
Co Ltd v Filmalter 1975 (2) SA 453 (W). 
104 See Percival v Wright op cit note 93. 
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wouldtherefore fall within the realm of insider trading 105• Where 
the assets of the company are purchased an altogether 
different set of rules apply. It is an inflexible rule of equity that 
a person who is in a fiduciary position is not entitled to profit 
from that position 106. Where a director has made a profit by 
reason of his office, he must account to his company for all all 
profits aquired by him, unless acquired or retained with the full 
knowledge and consent of his company107• 
The critics argue that whatever the structure, the managers 
benefit at the expense of the shareholders 108 because of their 
insider knowledge and their interest in the transaction. The 
fact that certain companies have shown an almost 
embarrassing turnaround underscores this assertion. The 
critics accept that higher levels of motivation are present wl:len 
managers own the business. They also accept that certain 
areas of the business can be rationalised which can lead to 
substantial savings 109• What they cannot accept is that the 
entire turnaround is due solely to 11turning off the lights and 
105 Insider trading is dealt with in detail in 4.4. 
106 Regal (Hastings) Limited v Gulliver [1942] 1 All E R 378; [1967] 2AC 134. See also 
Robinson v Randfontein Estates 1921 AD 168 and M S Blackman 'Directors and 
Officers (1991) 4 The Law of South Africa 217-221, MS Blackman The Fiduciary 
Doctrine and its Application to Directors of Companies (1970) 262-273, M Larkin 
'The Fiduciary Duties of the Company Director' (1979) South African Company Law 
Journal E31-E40 and J J du Plessis Maatskaplike Grondslae van die Regsposisie 
van Direkteure en Besturende Direkteure (Unpublished LLD Thesis, University of 
the Orange Free State, 1990) 132-146 for discussions on this topic. 
101 Robinson v Randfontein Estates 1921 AD 168. 
108 BJ Stein 'Going private is unethical' (1985) Nov Fortune 137 and A Lipper 'LBO's 
Based on Insider lnformation'(1987) Aug Venture 7. 
109 By way of an example, Macy's department store, used the simple expedient of 
providing identical bags for all its stores and buying them in bulk and saved a $1 
million per annum (B Little 'The Conscience of Wall Street' (1989) Barrons 82.) 
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using pencils until they are shorter11110• The real reason for the 
turnaround they say, is far more elementary. The management 
know exactly where the real values of the corporation lie, 
where costs can be reduced and productivity improved. Once 
the buy-out is completed, whole divisions and other corporate 
assets are sold off, debt repaid, leaving a company with 
virtually the same cash-flows as before 111 • 
They continue by arguing that if the directors know of a way to 
re-align corporate assets so as to realise more value, they are 
legally as well as ethically bound to identify and execute these 
strategies for the benefit of the stockholders. If they do not, 
they must account to the company for any benefits which have 
accrued to them due the belated execution of strategies which 
would have enhanced shareholder value 112• 
3.3 Insider Trading 
A Management Buy-Out, says Dan Dalton is the ultimate in inside 
information. He contends that if trading on inside information for a few 
thousand shares (or,indeed one share, for that matter) is in violation of 
federal securities law, then how can the buy-out be conducted in anything 
resembling good faith. Who else, he continues, has more pertinent 
information about the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities 
facing an organisation than the company's management113• 
110 A Lipper 'LBO's based on insider information' (1987) Venture 7. 
111 BJ Stein 'Dear Mr Ruder-Your view of LBO's is Dead Wrong' Jan (1989) Barrons 44. 
112 Ibid. 
113 D Dalton 'The Ubiquitous Leverage Buy-Out (LBO): Management Buy-Out or 
Management Sell-Out' (1989) 32 Business Horizons 38. 
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Insider trading may be described as the practice of dealing in the securities 
of a company on the strength of unpublished price sensitive information114• 
Insider trading has been the subject of intense discussion for many years115• 
In South Africa the various issues were explored at length by the Van Wyk 
de Vries Commission116• The Commission decided, based on the premise 
that insider trading has an adverse effect on on the confidence of the public. 
It has also been argued that insider trading should be permitted. Insiders, it 
is said assist the market to function efficiently in correctly reflecting the 
variations of corporate fortunes. The insider knows of information that would 
indicate that his own view of the market reflects the correct level of share 
prices, and that it is the market which is ill informed. Thus, the insider 
positively assists in bringing about a true state of affairs117• 
In any event to base the total prohibition of insider trading on the argument 
114 R Jooste 'Insider Trading'(1991) 20 Businessman's Law 248. Section 440F(2)(a) of 
the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended, defines unpublished price 
sensitive information as information which-
(i) relates to matters in respect of the internal affairs of the company or its 
operations, assets, earning power or involvement as offerer or offeree 
company in an affected transaction or proposed affected transation; 
(ii) is not generally available to the reaonable investor in the relevant markets; 
(iii) would reasonably be expected to affect materially the price of such security 
if it were generally available; 
115 BAK Rider Insider Trading (1983) 1 and LC B Gower Gower's Principles of 
Modern Company Law 4ed (1979) 630-640 
118 Main Report of the Commision of Enquiry into the Companies Act RP 45/1970 
prepared by an undisclosed committee. See B AK Rider 'The Regulation of Insider 
Trading in the Republic of South Africa'(1977) 94 SALJ 437 for a review of the 
issues relating to insider trading which faced the Commission during its sitting. The 
article also contains a discussion on the various shortcomings of the anti-insider 
trading provisions contained in the 1973 Companies Act arising from the 
Commission's recommendations. 
117 B A K Rider Insider Trading (1983) 1. See also B Kantor 'In Support of Insider 
Trading' (1991) 20 Businessman's Law 167 for a South African argument in favour 
of permitting insider trading and S Davidson's article 'Insider Trading: A reply to 
Brian Kantor' (1991) 21 Businessman's Law 94 for the contra-argument. 
v 
40 
of fairness was referred to by Henry Manne as "being a product of irrational 
self righteous indignation"118. Barry Rider to some extent agrees with him, 
but for different reasons. He argues that insider trading should not be 
prohibited merely because it is immoral. It should rather be prohibited 
because insider trading lowers the integrity of the market and thus the 
confidence that is reposed in it as a fair, efficient and economic allocator of 
scarce capital resources is eroded119. Therefore, he says, the primary 
justification for anti-insider trading regulation must be the protection and 
promotion of investor confidence in both the integrity and effeciency of the 
securities market. 
In the light of the considerations as set out by Rider, the overriding premise 
in the formulation of anti-insider trading regulations appears to be that 
"[t]he law should try and ensure that all individuals in the market are placed 
on an equal footing in so far as possible. This requires, firstly, timely and 
adequate disclosure by companies of price sensitive information and 
secondly, the prohibition of dealing on any such information which is 
undisclosed120." 
The premise upon which the anti-insider trading regulations is based and the 
buy-out process are, argue the critics, mutually exclusive. Namely, that the 
directors are the ultimate insiders and uni.ass provision is made for 
substantial disclosure, shareholders and other investors will, to their 
detriment, never be placed on an equal footing. 
118 Rider op cit note 115 at 2. 
119 B A K Rider Insider Trading (1983) 1. 
120 J H Farrar, N Furey and B Hannigan Farrar's Company Law 2ed (1988) 366. 
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4. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF MANAGEMENT BUY-OUTS 
4.1 Introduction 
It is submitted that the critics of Management Buy-Out's have been blinded 
by the enormous profits made by the buy-out teams in the past. It appears 
to them criminal that the management team should make vast fortunes while 
they, as shareholders, have made very little. The feeling is understandable 
but business cannot sustain their requests to have buy-outs prohibited or 
constrained to such an extent as to become unworkable. 
4.2 Fair Price 
4.2.1 Disclosure 
Value, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder121 • It has often been said 
that a fair price is one settled upon by a willing buyer and a willing seller. 
However, in the case of a buy-out, this maxim should contain the words 
"informed seller". This lack of information appears to be the critics greatest 
anathema and the one most easily rectified. Disclosure is a widely used 
panacea for most conflicts of interest122• It is submitted that there are so 
many disclosure provisions that it is unnecessary to enact even more to 
quell the fears of the critics. All that needs to be done is the rigorous 
application of the existing provisions. 
The City Code in London has decreed123 that when the buy-out team 
121 M Fishbein 'Valuation-an Ozymandian Task'(1988) July Corporate Finance 37. 
122 L Sealy 'The Disclosure Philosophy and Company Law Reform' (1981) 2 Company 
Lawyer 51. See also H Kripke 'The Myth of the Informed Layman' (1973) 28 
Business Lawyer 631 for his views on the oversimplification of disclosure principles. 
123 C Latter 'Panel MBO Changes - Conflicts of Interest' (1990) FT Mergers and 
Acquisitions XXVlll. See also Rule 19.4 of the London City Code on Take-overs 
and Mergers for the position in the United Kingdom regarding the equality of 
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supplies its own financial backers with confidential information concerning 
the financial position and prospects of the target company; it must make 
such information available to the independent directors and financial 
advisors who must assess and recommend the terms of the proposed offer, 
and to any person who is making a competing offer. It also requires that the 
buy-out team disclose all internal management information which they may 
use in arranging the financial backing. The independent non-executive 
directors are to retain, as early as possible, truly independent financial 
advisors. The buy-out directors may not express any opinion on the offer 
and must explain their conflict of interest to the shareholders124• It is 
submitted that this decree has addressed the problems and conflicts 
highlighted by the critics in that it requires full disclosure, thereby enabling 
third parties (whether independent advisers or shareholders) from 
establishing the true value of the company. 
In South Africa the Securities Regulation Code on Take-Overs and 
Mergers 125, contains the following provision dealing with disclosure during a 
buy-out126-
"If the offer or potential offer is for a management buy-out or similar 
transaction, the offeror or potential offeror shall, on request, forthwith furnish 
the independent directors [i.e. directors not involved in the buy-out] of the 
offeree company and its advisers with all information which has been 
furnished by the offeror or potential offeror to external providers or potential 
providers of finance (whether equity or debt) for the buy-out." 
information. 
124 Latter Ibid. 
125 Published by R 29 in Government Gazette No 12962 of 18 January 1991 The code 
came into operation on 1 February 1991. 
126 See Rule 17 of the South African Securities Regulation Code on Take~Overs and 
Mergers. 
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It is submitted that by requiring disclosure, it is possible to effect in respect 
of corporate conduct what could otherwise only have been achieved by 
detailed regulation. There are scores of disclosure provisions both statutory 
and in the common law which can be relied upon to force the directors to 
make the necessary revelations 127• 
It is further submitted that to prohibit buy-outs merely because its critics feel 
that they are not being provided with sufficient information in order to 
determine a fair price, serves no commercial purpose. The disclosure 
provisions in the Securities Regulation Code on Take-Overs and Mergers 
relating to Management Buy-Outs along with the other statutory and 
common law and Regulatory disclosure requirements128, satisfactorily protect 
127 There are a variety statutory disclosure requirements in the Companies Act (No.61 
of 1973), as amended. The directors have both a common law duty (See Robinson 
v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168) and a statutory duty (See 
section 234 to section 238 of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended) to 
disclose their interests in a contract. In terms of section 228 of the Companies Act 
(No.61 of 1973), as amended, the general meeting must approve the disposal of the 
whole or sustantially the whole of the undertaking of the company by way of an 
ordinary resolution. Although there is no statutory duty of disclosure in this case, 
the shareholders can refuse to approve the disposal unless adequate disclosure is 
provided. Despite these disclosure requirements, where the shareholders are not in 
a position to block the disposal, they have a remedy in sections 252 and 266 of the 
Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended or in terms of the common law if it is 
clear that there has been an oppression of minorities. (See D S Ribbens 'Disposal 
of the the undertaking or whole or greater part of the assets of the company' (1976) 
39 THRHR 162 and P E J Brooks 'Section 228 of the Companies Act (1987) 50 
THRHR 226 for further reading on this topic.). 
128 See footnote 127 for details on the various statutory disclosure requirements. In the 
case of 'going private' transactions the Johannesburg Stock Exchange requires 
substantial disclosures when there is a disposal or aquisition of assets making up at 
least 15% of the issued share capital and realised reserves of a listed company. It 
requires information relating to the nature of the assets sold or bought, the price, 
interests of directors, vendor's agreement etc. They also require an Auditor's 
Report giving financial details of the transaction and a fair and reasonable statement 
from the auditors or a Merchant Bank (See Rule 18 in section II of the Listings 
Requirements of the JSE read with Rule XI of the Practice notes) attesting to the 
fairness of the transaction. Where the shares are being purchased involving a 
change of control, similar disclosure requirements are required by the Securities 
Regulation Panel (See Rule 21 of the Code read with section Ill of the Listings 
Requirements of the JSE). They would also require that a similar offer be made to 
all the minorities in the event control changing which in itself requires certain 
disclosures (See Rule 8 read with Rule 22 of the Code). 
44 
shareholders against an unscrupulous management team who purposely 
withhold information for their own benefit. 
4.2.2. Fair price determination 
The allegations of manipulation of the earnings figures, although possible, 
are generally improbable. This conclusion was reached by Linda De Angelo 
after conducting in-depth empirical research on this point 129. She concluded 
that the reason why managers do not systematically understate earnings is 
because earnings are sufficiently important to attract careful scrutiny by the 
parties who would be adversely effected by a successful strategy of income 
manipulation. Due to the severity of the managerial conflicts of interest in a 
buy-out situation, public stockholders and their financial advisors invest 
resources to examine the company's financial statements for 
income-reducing accounting techniques by the incumbent management130. It 
is submitted that, in the light of this and other research, the critics 
allegations of earnings manipulation are generally without foundation. It 
does not, however, mean that such manipulation is impossible, but it is 
submitted that to prohibit buy-outs merely because some remote possibility 
of income manipulation exists, is untenable 131 • 
129 LE De Angelo 'Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of 
Management Buy-Outs of Public Stockholders'(1986) 61 Accounting Review 401. 
130 Ibid at 418. An example of income manipulation may be where the management 
have known for some time that they are going to make a bid for the company. 
They upgrade the entire plant at great cost, effectively doubling the plant's capacity 
but continue to run it at its historic capacity. The earnings will drop due to the 
massive capital expenditure which has been incurred. The assets are then 
subjected to some form of accelerated depreciation thereby reflecting a fixed asset 
figure in the balance sheet which is much lower than would ordinarily be the case. 
When the bid is made the price appears to be fair if based on the financial 
statements, but would not even begin to reflect the true potential of the company. 
After taking control of the company or its assets, production is doubled and the 
business suddenly begins to generate massive profits. The loans are repaid and a 
few years later the management exit from the buy-out having made a fortune. 
131 For references to contra-arguments see L E De Angelo 'Accounting Numbers as 
Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buy-Outs of Public 
Stockholders'(1986) 61 Accounting Review 401 footnote 1. 
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4.3 Self interest and secret profits 
Stein alleges that directors of companies know where the real values lie in a 
corporation, where the opportunities for squeezing out extra value are, and 
how to make the corporation yield as much money as possible in either sale 
or operational mode. He says first, that this is tantamount to secret profits 
and must be accounted for; and secondly that the legislature should prohibit 
buy-outs so as to prevent it from happening in the first place 132• 
It is submitted that the first part of Stein's argument has some merit in 
theory, but on a practical basis, both it and the second part are in most 
respects untenable. When the assets are sold to the directors and they 
have not disclosed the assets' true worth to the company or its 
shareholders, the shareholders are, via the company, fully entitled in 
common law133 to require the directors to account for any 11secret profits11134, 
albeit to the company. However, certain practical problems exist. First, if 
the aggrieved shareholders are no longer shareholders of the target 
company135 they have no locus standi and can no longer force the directors 
to account for the profits made as a result of the non-disclosure136 • This 
132 BJ Stein 'Dear Mr Ruder-Your view of LBO's is Dead Wrong' Jan (1989) Barrens 
44. 
133 H S Cilliers and M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 561-570 for a discussion on 
the common law. See also section 266 of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as 
amended for the statutory derivative action. 
134 See Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 AD 168 and Regal 
(Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] 1 All E R 378. 
135 There is a very real possibility that by the time the shareholders realise that 
inordinate profits have been made by the management as a result of 
non-disclosure, the shareholders would either have sold their shares in the "cash 
shell"(a company whose only asset is cash) or the company may have been wound 
up. 
136 Foss v Harbottle {1843) 2 Hare 461, 67 All E R 189. See also H S Cilliers and 
M L Benade Company Law 4ed (1982) 563-570 for further discussion on this topic. 
See also 0 Schreiner 'The Shareholders's Derivative Action-A Comparative Study of 
Procedures' (1979) 96 SALJ 203 for a discussion on the derivative action in various 
jurisdictions and also S J Naude' Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur 
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problem can be solved, however, if the shareholders had subsequently sold 
their shares in the 11 cash shell" to the directors. If this were the case the 
aggrieved shareholders could either cancel the sale of shares on the basis 
of contractual misrepresentation137 and have the Member's Register 
rectified 138 or could envoke the common law remedy available to them under 
the Lex Aguilia139 and claim damages for any loss arising as a result of the 
material non-disclosure. 
Where the management team buys the shares of the target company the 
problems relating to locus standi and the accountability by the directors of 
secret profits do not exist. In the event of there having been 
misrepresentation by the management, the aggrieved shareholder can rely 
on the contractual and delictual remedies as set out in the common law 
which have been discussed above or on the statutory remedy under the 
anti-insider trading regulations140• 
Secondly, to require management to account for secret profits is easier said 
than done. It is submitted that the aggrieved shareholder will find it difficult, 
if not impossible, to prove which portion of the profits made by team, post 
the buy-out, was made as a result of non-disclosure prior to the transaction. 
As regards Stein's second contention; it has long been recognised that, 
(1969) 236-246 on this topic. 
137 See J F Coaker and D T Zeffertt Mercantile Law of South Africa 18ed (1984) 
91-115 for details of the common law remedies regarding misrepresentation and S 
J Naude' Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur (1969) 203-206 for his 
views. 
138 See section 118 of the Companies Act (No.61of1973), as amended. 
139 See Pretorius v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1963 (3) SA 410 rN) and the 
recent Appellate Division case of Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 
559 (A) which has at last accepted the principle of delictual liability for pure 
economic loss where there has been negligent misrepresentation during the course 
of the negotiation of a contract. 
140 Insider trading is dealt with in detail later in this work. 
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where a director has an interest in a contract entered into by his company, a 
danger of a conflict of interest always exists141 • It is submitted that where 
such a situation occurs, the law recognises that, despite his best intentions, 
the director may be swayed by his own self interest and as such, 
shareholders must be protected as far as possible. The common law and 
the legislature did not, however, see it fit to prohibit the contract wherein the 
director has an interest. Rather, it required that there be adequate 
disclosure142 of the interest (adequate disclosure means that all relevant 
details are to be disclosed143). It is submitted that the conflict facing the 
directors in a buy-out transaction can be no more onerous than the conflict 
facing the directors interested in a contract entered into by the company, 
thus in the light of the above there can be no reason why buy-outs should 
be prohibited merely because there is a degree of self interest involved. 
4.4. Insider Trading 
The 1989 Companies Amendment Act (No.78 of 1989) and the 1990 
Companies Amendment Act (No.69 of 1990) contained new provisions 
relating to insider trading 144• These Acts replaced the old section 233 of the 
Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended. The reason for this 
141 H S Cilliers and M L Benade Company Law 4 ed (1982) 346-349. See R C Clark 
Corporate Law 1 ed (1986) 159-189 for the position in the United States of America, 
L C B Gower Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 4 ed (1979) 584-602 for 
the position in the United Kingdom. 
142 Although a director's common law duty of disclosure of a material interest in a 
contract is to the company in general meeting, sections 234 - 241 of the Companies 
Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended, permits such disclosure of interest in contracts to 
be made to the other directors acting on behalf of the company (provided it is 
permitted by the Articles). It would clearly be impractical to convene a general 
meeting every time a contract in which a director was interested needed to be 
ratified (See 0 Britzius South African Company Secretarial Practice (1988) 88-92 
and S J Naude' Die Regsposisie van die Maatskappydirekteur (1969) 176-187.) 
143 See Novick v Comair Holdings Ltd 1979(2) SA 116(W) 
144 These amendments are now contained in section 440F of the Companies Act 
(No.61 of 1973), as amended. 
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amendment says Jooste, is that the provisions introduced in 1973 were 
ineffectual and not a single prosecution for their contravention has 
occurred145• 
The new Section 440(F)(1) of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973),as 
amended provides that: 
''.Any person who whether directly or indirectly, knowingly deals in a security 
on the basis of unpublished price sensitive information in respect of that 
security, shall be guilty of an offence ... . " 
This new amendment has significantly increased the scope of the 
Companies Act's anti-insider trading provisions. The new provisions 
ensnare three categories of recalcitrants: first, the "primary insider", who by 
virtue of a relationship of trust or other contractual relationship has access to 
inside information; secondly, the outsider or 11tippee 11 who obtains the insrde 
information from the primary insider or from another tippee either voluntarily 
or inadvertently; thirdly, a person, whether an insider or an outsider, who 
gains access to inside information through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, 
misrepresentation, or any other wrongful method146• 
It is submitted that implementation of section 440F(3) has also made it 
easier to prosecute the perpetrators of insider trading. This section provides 
that if it is proved that the accused was in possession of unpublished 
price-sensitive information in respect of the security in question at the time 
of the alleged offence, he or it shall be deemed, unless the contrary is 
proved, that he knowingly dealt in that security on the basis of such 
information. Therefore, if it can be proved that a person was in possession 
of insider information and dealt in that security, it is presumed that there had 
145 A Jooste 'Insider Trading-A New Clampdown' (1991) 20 Businessman's Law 248. 
146 Ibid. 
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been insider trading. 
The onus is thus passed onto the accused to prove, on a balance of 
probabilities, that he did not deal in the shares on the basis of such 
information. 
In South Africa the penalties for insider trading have also been considerably 
bolstered in the new provisions by allowing the courts to sentence the 
perpetrator to a fine not exeeding R500 000 or to a term of imprisonment 
not exeeding 1 O years or both 147• 
In addition to the fortified criminal liability for insider trading, the new 
anti-insider trading regulations also contain provisions for a civil action by 
the aggrieved party. In terms of section 440F(4)(a) of the Companies Act 
'~ny person who contravenes subsection (1) shall be liable to any other 
person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of such a 
contravention." 
Section 440(4)(b) provides that: 
"In the case of of dealings in a security on a stock exchange or financial 
market as defined in section 1 of the Financial Markets Control Act, 
1989,(Act No.55 of 1989), the plaintiff shall not need to prove intention or 
negligence towards him or it an action contemplated in paragraph (a)." · 
This statutory civil remedy seems, at first blush, to be a major departure 
from the inefficiencies of the past. This says Jooste is not the case 148• He 
147 See section 441 (1) as to the penalties for insider trading. 
148 R Jooste 'Insider Trading in South Africa' (1991) 107 SALJ 603. 
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argues that in the great majority of cases of instances resorting to the civil 
remedy is a exercise in futility. The reason he says is that there is no 
causal link or nexus between the contravention of the criminal provisions· of 
section 440F and the loss or damage. This is due to the fact that the 
alleged victim would, in the case of a stock exchange dealing, have traded 
at the price in any event regardless of the fact that there had been insider 
trading. The damage or loss contemplated by the legislature was the 
difference between what the victim would have paid had the inside 
information been known and what he paid. This, Jooste argues, cannot be 
correct as the loss arose not because of the insider trading but because the 
inside information was not made public. Thus no casual link is present. 
It is respectfully submitted that this argument is flawed. The learned writer 
has imputed the essentialia of causation contained in the common law 
remedy into the statutory remedy. It is submitted that causation, although 
essential in the common law remedy of delict, has by implication been 
dispensed with in the statutory remedy, just as the requirement of 
negligence or intention has been dispensed with in Stock Exchange dealing. 
An aggrieved party would have to show only that the insider contravened the 
criminal provisions of section 440F and not that the perpetrator1s insider· 
trading caused him damage. In order to prove his damages, the aggrieved 
person may need to retain experts to show what the true price should have 
been had the inside information been publicly available. In the case of a 
stock exchange transaction he would not have to prove negligence or 
intention, but would need to do so in the case of a non-stock exchange 
transaction 149• 
It is submitted that in the case of Management Buy-Outs the aggrieved 
shareholder can rely on this remedy if he believes that the directors of the 
buy-out company have made profits at his expense through some inside 
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knowledge. It suggested that this claim like any other claim will prescribe 
after three years 150. 
One last issue to be discussed is that of access to information by an 
aggrieved party to allow him to prosecute his claim. As the law stands at 
present, an aggrieved person has no right to any information relating to the 
affairs of the company once he is no longer a shareholder of the 
company151 • Nor has he any right to inspect the financial statements unless 
it is a public company and he can obtain the accounts from the Registrar of 
Companies152• It is submitted that this is a lacuna in the law as an erstwhile 
shareholder may only realise that he has been a victim of insider trading 
when he perchance learns of the massive profits that the company is 
·making. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the late 1970's and early 1980's Management Buy-Outs were acclaimed 
as the saviours of failing divisions and companies and a means of 
re-vitalising stagnant corporations. The huge profits made in the process led 
many shareholders to believe that they were being cheated out of their hard 
earned wealth. 
Critics have contended that these buy-outs were unethical and immoral, 
because there was an inevitable breach of fiduciary duty arising from from 
the irreconcilable conflicts of interest which emerge during the buy-out 
process. The management cannot act impartially whilst acting both as 
fiduciary and as principal. Furthermore, the management are the ultimate 
150 See section 11 (d) of the Prescription Act No 68 of 1969, as amended. 
151 See note 136. 
152 See section 302(4) of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended. 
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insiders and as such have an almost insurmountable informational 
advantage over the shareholders and other potential investors. For these 
reasons they say Management Buy-Outs should be either prohibited or 
heavily regulated. 
There can be no disagreement with the critics that conflicts of interest and 
opportunities for insider trading may arise during the buy-out process. 
However, their suggestion that buy-outs should be prohibited should not 
seriously be entertained. Neither commerce nor our Company Law (both 
common and statute) are strangers to conflicts of interest or insider trading. 
They have chosen, rather than prohibiting transactions involving conflicts of 
interest, to impose strict rules of disclosure to solve or prevent many of the 
real or potential disputes which may arise. 
It is submitted that in South Africa, virtually all the criticsms levelled at 
Management Buy-Outs by the critics can effectively be dealt with by a 
rigorous application of the strengthened regulations relating to insider 
trading 153, the surfeit of disclosure provisions in the Companies Act154, the 
disclosures required by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange155 and Securities 
Regulation Panel 156 and the protections offered by the common law157. 
The only area that appears to have been neglected is that of disclosure after 
the buy-out. It is recommended that a new section be promulgated in the 
Companies Act or included in the Code to remedy this hiatus. The 
153 See 4.4 above. 
154 See footnotes 126 and 127. 
155 See Rule 18 in section of the Listings Requirements of the JSE. 
156 See Rule 17 of the Securities Regulation Code on Take-Overs. 
157 See Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd. 1921 AD 139; Regal 
(Hastings) Limited v Gulliver [1967] 2AC 134, [1942] All E R 378; Pretorius v Natal 
Soyth Sea Investment Trust Ltd 1963 (3) SA 41 O f'N) and Bayer South Africa (Pty) 
Ltd v Frost 1991 (4) SA 559 (A). 
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Securities Regulation Panel must be permitted to call on any company, 
which has been subjected to a "going private" buy-out, regardless of the 
structure used, for a period of three years, to disclose their audited financial 
statements and any other information the Panel may reasonably request. 
The financial and any other information is to be kept confidential and to be 
used by the Panel only to ascertain whether or not there had been any · 
non-disclosure during the buy-out period. If it is found that inordinately high 
profits are being made within this period, a thorough investigation must then 
be launched and the directors called upon to answer questions in this 
regard. If the Panel is of the the opinion that there had been material 
non-disclosure during the buy-out period, the Panel should be permitted, 
after having obtained a court order to this effect, to sieze any documents 
they may deem necessary to show the extent to which the directors have 
profited from the non-disclosure. This will permit the Panel to prepare a 
criminal case under the insider trading provisions158 where shares had been 
purchased whilst the directors were in posession of unpublished price 
sensitive information 159• The problem of course is what to do if assets as 
opposed to shares were purchased. This purchase of assets on the basis of 
unpublished information is clearly not an offence in terms of the Act160• It is 
suggested that perhaps in the case of "going private" transaction involving 
the sale of assets, Rule 17161 of the Securities Regulation Code on 
Take-Overs should include a provision which makes it an offence not to 
disclose any material information, which could effect the price of the assets 
during a buy-out. A further provision should then be enacted permitting 
aggrieved shareholders an action to recover any losses they may have 
158 In terms section 440F(1) of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended. 
159 See footnote 114 for the definition of unpublished price sensitive information. 
160 The section clearly speaks of a "security". 
161 Rule 17 makes provision for the disclosure to the independent directors of the 
offeree company of all information furnished to the offerer's providers of finance. 
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suffered as a result of the non-disclosure 162. 
It is submitted that the enactment of the above or similar provisions will 
more than satisfy any of the criticisms leveled at Management Buy-Outs 
which have not already been addressed by existing legislation and common 
law. 
-ooOOoo-
162 This provision would be much the same as the civil remedy contained in section 
440F(4)(a) of the Companies Act (No.61 of 1973), as amended. 
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